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Abstract 
In this journal, in 2007, Keith Hayward criticized situational crime prevention (SCP) 
and rational choice. The main thesis was that SCP cannot tackle expressive crimes of 
anger, hostility and excitement. The secondary thesis was that this was because the 
rational choice perspective cannot account for intangible aspects of offender 
decision-making. Hayward’s cultural criminology was offered as better explaining 
expressive and other crimes. The present article suggests fundamental issues may 
have been overlooked. Some of the many ways SCP applies to expressive and 
irrational crimes, and how readily they fit into the choice framework, are outlined, 
and a preliminary critique of Hayward’s cultural criminology is offered  
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Introduction 
 
Shoplifting is a victimless crime, like punching someone in the dark.  
(Nelson Muntz1) 
 
In volume 41 of this journal, Keith Hayward’s (2007) ‘Situational crime prevention 
and its discontents: rational choice theory versus the “culture of now”’2 launched a 
most enthusiastic attack upon situational crime prevention (SCP) and rational choice. 
They were variously impaled as, among other things, ‘deracinated’ (p. 233) and 
‘hollow’ (p. 232), based on ‘taken-for-granted assumptions’ (p. 245) that ‘lack 
reflexivity’ (p. 233), making them ‘blind’ (pp. 244, 246) and a ‘major step back’ (p. 
236). These are strong words for an academic study in any domain. As such, one 
would expect them to be based on rigorous argument and overwhelming evidence.  
Hayward’s main thesis was that SCP cannot prevent crimes that are deemed 
expressive. Expressive crimes are those which contain a significant emotional element 
such as anger, hostility and excitement. It was observed that ‘much of the critical 
element of this article turns around the distinction between expressive crimes and 
those that can be described as ‘‘acquisitive”’ (p. 238), with SCP restricted to the 
prevention of acquisitive and property crimes that are the ‘stock in trade’ (p. 237) of 
choice theorists. Fortunately, however, expressive crime is a key focus of cultural 
criminology, the perspective upon which Hayward’s critique was based.  
The secondary thesis of the article was that the rational choice perspective 
fails to account for emotional or other intangible aspects of decision-making. This is 
summarized in the statement that ‘not all actors are economically self-interested’ (p. 
233). This failing is surely why SCP cannot prevent expressive crime: since choice 
theory only incorporates notions of monetary rewards and not other aspects of 
decision-making, SCP can only focus on acquisitive or property crime. So burglary 
might be tackled by SCP but not joyriding because it has no monetary goal. This 
secondary thesis was underpinned by a set of specific criticisms that deem choice 
theory conceptually limited, restricted in its incorporation of issues such as 
impulsivity and irrationality, and unable to adapt to recent criticism.  
It was further proposed that expressive crimes of various sorts have increased 
greatly in recent years, and thereby implied that SCP is of decreasing relevance. The 
increase in expressive crime was explained as the result of a ‘culture of now’, because 
selfish consumerism has spawned alienated ‘sensation-gatherers’ (p. 239) and ‘urban-
adventurer criminals’ (p. 244). Fortunately, these are key concepts of the cultural 
criminologist. A large number of expressive and sensation-gathering crimes are 
touched on by Hayward, many summarized here as table 1. It was concluded that 
most criminology must seek to learn from cultural criminology if it is to remain 
relevant and account for the growing crime problem – and not just expressive crime 
because cultural criminology is equally at home when explaining all crime types (p. 
238). 
An introductory note is warranted on the style of the 2007 article. In addition 
to what seem to be derisive terms mentioned in the opening paragraph, aspects of the 
work appear curiously designed. For example, though the article purports to focus on 
expressive crime, this appears to become a platform to cast aspersions on all of 
situational crime prevention and choice theory. It was noted that ‘despite considerable 
success in combating certain forms of economic/acquisitive criminality . . . much of 
this RCT inspired SCP lacks reflexivity’ (pp. 232–3). The start of the sentence 
appears to be a compliment but the criticism at the end negates it and effectively 
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refers to all aspects of SCP. In the Conclusions a similar compliment to SCP is 
sandwiched between one sentence that labels it ‘blind’ (p. 244) and implies by 
association that it ‘strangles everyday life’ (p. 244) and another asserting it is based 
on ‘taken-for-granted assumptions’ (p. 245) and that it does not ‘comprehend’ or 
‘even acknowledge’ (p. 245) contemporary concerns about risk and insecurity. More 
generally, SCP and related perspectives are discussed as having ‘beliefs’ (pp. 235, 
238, 243, 246), with beliefs elsewhere defined as ‘religious and metaphysical’ (p. 
242). Consequently, when Ken Pease is described as a ‘high priest’ (p. 234), this 
seems aimed at associating unscientific qualities with his work. Likewise, Ronald V. 
Clarke is identified as the leading proponent (p. 235) of the same SCP and rational 
choice that are derided as hollow, blind and a major step back, and Marcus Felson’s 
work is complimented as ‘seminal’ (p. 244) but its foundation undermined as 
‘proceeding with the belief that criminal motivation is a given’ (p. 235).3 Perhaps this 
is cultural criminology’s accepted style, but to the present writer the compliments 
seem disingenuous while other aspects might be interpreted as close to ad hominem 
argument. To suggest these examples were the result of accident or coincidence 
would surely do an injustice both to Dr Hayward’s rhetorical skill and to the laws of 
probability.   
 
Table 1: Hayward’s list of ‘expressive’ and ‘sensation-gathering’ crimes 
Joyriding 
Drug use 
Football hooliganism 
Fire-setting 
Street robbery 
Binge drinking 
Gang-related crime, gang membership 
Peer-group fighting 
Child molestation 
Rape 
Drunken assault 
Happy slapping 
Graffiti 
Skateboarding 
Illegal BASE jumping 
Train surfing 
Parkour ‘free runners’ 
‘Street protesters’ 
‘Other urban-adventurer criminals’ 
Source: Hayward (2007: 237, 239, 244). 
 
This rejoinder to the 2007 article has four main sections, then a short 
conclusion. By means of introduction to the subject, an overview of the situational 
approach is first. This is followed by a section showing that many situational 
measures have been used to prevent the crime types listed in table 1, then a review of 
Hayward’s criticisms of the rational choice perspective, and some preliminary 
examination of the perspective known as cultural criminology. 
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The Situational Approach to Social Policy, Reducing Social Harm and 
Improving Quality of Life 
 
The ‘situational’ approach seeks to reduce society’s harms and improve quality of life 
by modifying the design of products, systems and environments. This can range from 
simple and cheap measures to complex, expensive technologies. In health contexts, a 
simple measure is the removal of salt cellars from the table – high blood pressure 
being a common problem. Another is the use of condoms to block the spread of 
disease. Situational measures to tackle cancer include increasing tobacco taxes and 
banning smoking in public places. In fire safety, some people will smoke in bed 
despite the warnings, so we encourage fire-retardant mattresses and smoke alarms. In 
road safety, situational measures are particularly prevalent, from every traffic light 
and speed bump, to airbags that reduce injury on impact. A simple characterization of 
aspects of the situational approach is the popular aphorism that ‘it is easier to act 
yourself into a new way of thinking than to think yourself into a new way of acting’ 
(Anonymous4). Encouraging people to want to drive better is laudable but proves 
difficult after a point, while there are immense social gains from designing cars, roads 
and road furniture to reduce the frequency and severity of crashes. Many measures 
promote better driving, as when ‘Children Crossing’ signs stimulate conscience, and 
road safety is an area with much criminological overlap. One of the present writer’s 
favourite situational tactics is the little bumpy nodules (rumble strips) at the edge of 
the motorway that awaken slumbering drivers to stop them becoming more dangerous 
or criminal drivers.  
 In an ideal society, able-bodied persons would be good enough not to park 
near the entry door, leaving spaces for those with limited mobility. Instead, disabled 
parking spaces are designated to encourage community responsibility and remove 
excuses for accidental antisocial parking (see Godson and Farrell 2005 for a survey of 
related measures on a university campus). Table 2 gives a tip-of-the-iceberg glimpse 
of situational measures in a range of social policy contexts.5 
In environmental climate control, situational measures include catalytic 
converters, recycling technologies, renewable power (wind, tidal, solar) and various 
regulatory systems and other measures to encourage them such as carbon offset 
schemes, tax-breaks for environmentally friendly behaviour or increased taxes for 
pollution. The notion that the ‘polluter pays’ is well known in climate control and is 
an emerging area in crime prevention: imagine, for example, if mobile phone 
manufacturers and networks, who bear almost none of the huge social cost of phone 
theft and robberies, could be encouraged to design safer phones and systems to reduce 
and internalize their ‘pollution’ (see Pease 1998; Clarke and Newman 2005; Home 
Office 2006, on incentivization and corporate social responsibility). Likewise, 
situational measures are often used to tackle other ‘crimes of the powerful’. This 
includes strategies such as product testing to protect consumers, audits to prevent 
white-collar crime, technology and systems to reduce abuse of power by police and 
others, and regulatory systems to reduce collusion and price-fixing. SCP, like 
situational social policies more generally, is necessarily interventionist. It seeks to 
tackle market failure which over-provides harm and under-provides safety. Politically, 
for the present writer, it has much in common with the ‘liberal paternalism’ of Nudge 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008). With respect to the economic recession under way at the 
time of going to press, improved financial regulation may prove the relevant 
situational measure to prevent recurrence.  
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Table 2: Situational measures to reduce harms and improve quality of life 
Context Examples  
Road safety Speed limits; driving on one side of road; safety belts; 
crumple zones; prohibition of injury-causing bonnet 
ornaments; traffic lights; airbags; indicator lights; pelican 
crossings; ‘traffic-calming’ measures; cycle helmets; cycle 
paths 
Child protection Child-proof lids on toxic substance containers; ‘safe’ toys 
without swallowable parts or lead paint; fire-guards; stair-
guards; school crossing guards 
Health and safety at 
work 
Safety helmets; protective guards on machinery; work time 
limits 
Climate control Catalytic converters; recycling; patent protection for safe-
emissions technologies; tradable permits, feed-in tariffs and 
other market-based incentives; cleaner power technologies 
(wind, tidal, solar)  
Food safety Content and temperature-sensitive labels; tamper-proof 
containers; best-before and use-by dates; restrictions on 
additives; quality control checks  
Fire safety Fire-retardant materials; safety matches; fire doors; fire 
extinguishers; escape-route maps; maximum population 
policies in night clubs 
Crime Garden hedges that define territory; self-locking front doors; 
immobilizers; barcodes; car licence plates; property marking; 
entry-phones; office receptionists (see many papers in the 
Crime Prevention Studies series)  
Health No salt on dining table; calorie content labelling; condoms; 
increased tobacco prices; smoking bans; surgeons’ face-
masks; opt-out organ donation 
Disability Disabled parking bays; many measures mandated under the 
Disability Discrimination Act  
Sports Electronic timing; slow motion replays; weigh-ins; drug tests; 
provision of facilities 
Education/academia Anonymous marking; peer-review; external examiners; 
professional body practising requirements. 
Drugs Legal drugs: Medical licences; drug trials; systems to prevent 
diversion. Illegal drugs: Provision of bleach or clean needles; 
safe injection ‘shooting galleries’; testing pills for impurities  
Trading standards Taximeters; fixed-price fares; weighbridges (to tackle goods-
vehicle overloading); kite-marks and quality control; Weights 
and measures checks generally  
Art Art Loss Register; signatures (‘tags’ for graffiti); provenance 
establishment. 
 
 
Situational prevention across the spectrum largely bypasses blame or 
punishment for harmful behaviour and, instead, seeks to design it out. Cornish and 
Clarke (2003) have so far identified 25 techniques of SCP. The framework can be 
used to classify existing practices so that, for example, priority police alarms installed 
at the homes of survivors of domestic violence invoke the technique of ‘enhancing 
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surveillance’ while empowering victims, providing a breathing space to develop a 
safety strategy while remaining at home in safety (Lloyd et al. 1994; Erez and Ibarra 
2007). Livestock branding is an age-old form of the technique ‘identifying property’ 
which parallels parts-marking in cars. Disguising your pricey laptop with a scruffy 
bag is ‘target concealment’, as is an unmarked bullion van. And much SCP, like 
situational measures elsewhere in social policy, is a taken-for-granted part of 
everyday life – think of separate toilets for women and men (the technique of 
‘deflecting offenders’). And the best SCP can change the default to be secure, 
unobtrusive and liberating – so modern cars have auto-locking and immobilizers as 
the easy default rather than tedious locking of individual door-knobs and an ugly add-
on steering wheel brace. The interested reader is encouraged to look at the interactive 
table of the 25 techniques of situational prevention, giving far more crime-related 
examples, available via the excellent website of the Center for Problem-Oriented 
Policing.6 
 
 
Preventing Expressive Crime 
 
If you haven’t contemplated murder, you ain’t been in love. If you haven’t 
seriously thought about killing a muthaf***a, you ain’t been in love. If you 
haven’t had a can of rat poison in your hand, and looked at it for 45 minutes 
straight, you ain’t been in love. If you haven’t bought a shovel and a bag, and 
a rug to roll their fat ass up in, you ain’t been in love. If you haven’t practised 
your alibi in front of the mirror, you ain’t been in love. And the only thing that 
stopped you from killing this muthaf***a – was a episode of CSI. Oh man, 
they’re thorough. I’d better make up – they might catch my ass. (Chris Rock, 
stand-up comedian7) 
 
This section explains how SCP can be applied to crimes that Hayward deems 
expressive. In passing, it touches on elements of how such crimes are incorporated 
within choice theory. Joyriding, hooliganism and graffiti are tackled as three popular 
‘expressive’ crimes, happy slapping as a relatively new crime so that change and 
adaptation are included, and child sex offending because it appears as one of the most 
difficult crime types to address. For the sake of brevity, only these five of the crimes 
in table 1 are addressed below, but the same type of analysis could be applied to all 
the others.  
 
 
Joyriding 
 
The ‘joy’ in joyriding derives from the thrill of the chase plus the prestige among 
peers and passengers. Taking a car is instrumental, a means to that end (Cornish 
1994). Speed-bumps and traffic calming are situational measures that reduce the joy. 
Better door locks, remote and auto-locking reduce the chances that a door might be 
unlocked or easily jimmied (Southall and Ekblom 1985). Secure car parks8 with, inter 
alia, barriers, CCTV, attendants and clear sight-lines reduce theft opportunities 
(Webb et al. 1992). GPS tracking is used to locate stolen cars. Traffic cameras can 
provide photographic evidence and so deter thieves (PA Consulting 2004). There has 
been more than one evaluation of steering column locks (Mayhew 1992; Webb 1997). 
More effective recent immobilizers mean cars cannot be driven away even if a break-
 7
in succeeds (Brown 2004). With respect to choice theory, some of these situational 
measures increase the perceived and actual cost of committing the offence. Others 
reduce the perceived and actual rewards.  
Perhaps the most interesting omission from Hayward’s analysis is any 
recognition that car theft in England and Wales fell by 61 per cent in the decade to 
2007 even with far more cars on the road (Taylor et al. 2007: 77), and that this was 
primarily a reduction in taking for joyriding and transportation rather than permanent 
theft (Brown and Thomas 2003; Brown 2004; Webb 2005). Society has fewer 
joyrides but far more joy.  
 
 
Football hooliganism 
 
Many fans travel on designated coaches, and others are escorted from rail and other 
stations to reduce altercations during transit, while those with cars are encouraged to 
park in stewarded parking. Attendance bans restrict the access of known hooligans to 
games. In a stadium, fans are segregated and monitored by multiple stewards, CCTV 
and targeted photography, and alcohol is often controlled. When a game ends, crowd 
dispersal is staggered, to allow one team’s supporters to leave first, and supervised. 
All-seater stadiums were a situational measure introduced after the Hillsborough 
disaster, as recommended by the Taylor Report (Taylor 1990). Due at least in part to 
such measures, ‘[t]here has been a long term decline in hooliganism since the mid-
1980s’ (University of Leicester 2001). The definitive account of SCP and British 
hooliganism may remain to be written,10 and football hooliganism still exists, but 
Hayward’s suggestion that situational measures are irrelevant is quite surprising.  
 
 
Graffiti 
 
One renowned graffiti-writer, alleged to be Robin Gunningham from Bristol (BBC 
2008), trademarked his alter ego as Banksy. One of his pieces sold for £288,000 in 
2007 (BBC 2007). He is talented and now wealthy, but when he started out the 
primary reward was likely to have been psychological. It is this psychological reward 
which is the common factor across all types of graffiti. In the ‘rational’ offending 
decision, the reward is the sensation experienced as satisfaction and thrill in knowing 
that other people must view it, which Martha Smith’s (2003) review identifies as a 
form of control. Where the graffiti is sufficiently sophisticated that it carries a 
signature tag, there is the extra reward of the kudos from friends and peers or, in 
Banksy’s case, the media. When graffiti is undertaken as a form of persecution the 
offender is rewarded by knowing the victim will suffer both psychologically and 
monetarily. Racist graffiti is often repeatedly targeted against the same victims as a 
component of prolonged intimidation and victimization (Sampson and Phillips 1995). 
The rewards of gang graffiti include not just recognition but also intimidation and 
turf-marking (Spicer 2007). And while most graffiti is vandalism, not art, it remains 
the case that, from the more prevalent nasty everyday scrawl to the most 
sophisticated, it all fits easily into the cost–benefit framework of choice theory.  
In the present context there is no little irony in the fact that graffiti artists use 
signature tags to retain their informal intellectual ownership. This is the situational 
technique of ‘identifying property’. But more importantly, there is an abundance of 
situational measures to tackle graffiti and other vandalism. They can be as simple as 
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graffiti boards which are easily cleaned or replaced, anti-graffiti paint and surfaces, 
and restrictions upon the sale of spray cans, and they range to painting a wall a 
different colour, routine repainting (akin to cleaning), imposing a pre-emptive mural, 
better management of void properties, improving sight-lines for natural surveillance, 
and alley-gating to block access to vulnerable targets. Kelling and Sloan-Hewitt’s 
famous 1992 study showed how regular cleaning of New York subway cars reduced 
graffiti. Clean cars meant graffiti writers did not receive the reward of knowing 
thousands of commuters would view their work. Many of them quit and there was 
little displacement – the scratching of subway car windows being less serious and 
‘displacement’ to photography being welcomingly positive (Snyder 2006). More 
recently, the city of Vancouver claims an 80 per cent reduction in graffiti over a three-
year period, having implemented a portfolio of measures via a multi-agency 
partnership (Spicer 2007). There is a range of guides on tackling graffiti and other 
forms of vandalism and criminal damage available from the Home Office.9 Vandalism 
fell 19 per cent in England and Wales in the decade to 2006 (Hoare and Cotton 2006: 
95).  
 
 
Happy slapping 
 
Happy slapping is an assault filmed by mobile phone (Akwagyiram 2005). 
Distributing the video brings an extension of the psychological reward to offenders in 
the form of kudos, and can impose further psychological costs on victims. Happy 
slapping is caused by the new criminal opportunity presented by mobile phones with 
video facilities, with the Internet providing a means of distribution. The potentially 
larger audience may bring greater reward, but otherwise it remains a form of bullying 
and criminal assault. There are both specific and general situational responses. There 
are restrictions on the distribution of violent videos on public Internet sites such as 
YouTube. Mobile phone cameras facilitate evidence collection by victims and others. 
In addition, proud offenders might be captured on their own film, and video uploads 
might be traced to their source. Bullying is often repeated and concentrated in and 
around particular locations such as schools (Farrington 1993; Pitts and Smith 1995), 
so measures to prevent repetition such as changing routes and timings, may be 
appropriate. Routine precautions (Felson and Clarke 1995) such as being 
accompanied by friends can act as a situational deterrent. Assaults are contained by 
many measures in public and private settings. Bars and clubs can design layouts and 
management policies to reduce assault opportunities, urban areas can be shaped to 
influence the flow of people, and taxis and public transport can operate in ways that 
reduce opportunities for assault (see e.g. Homel 1997).  
It is clear that situational responses to happy slapping, as with many forms of 
assault and social disorder, are in their infancy. Future situational responses may 
include intelligent software that identifies movements (based on stance, gait, eye 
contact) that are the signature of violence or its precursors (Darker et al. 2007). That 
SCP should seek to anticipate and adapt as crime changes is a critical component of 
the approach (Ekblom 1997, 1999; Pease 1997). 
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Child sexual abuse 
 
‘Child molestation’ is on Hayward’s list of expressive or sensation-gathering crimes 
where SCP may have ‘inherent problems . . . when trying to devise initiatives to stem 
offences’ (p. 237). Much child sexual assault is by familiars – family, friends and 
trusted others – whose choice is facilitated by easy access to vulnerable targets 
(reducing effort and risks). Would-be child sex offenders may take jobs as children’s 
sports coaches, priests, or other posts which provide access. Society is gradually 
developing its repertoire of situational responses, from routine precautions such as 
accompanying children, and the ‘buddy system’ (all about personal safety), to 
employee background checks, teaching parents and security staff to recognize 
grooming, the monitoring of Internet chat rooms, glass panels in interview room 
doors, and supervision of intimate tasks such as bathing (Wortley 2006). These are a 
few of many. The reader is referred to the set of studies in Wortley and Smallbone’s 
book Situational Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse (2006; see also Smallbone and 
Wortley 2001; Beauregard and Leclerc 2007; then work backwards through the 
literature on ‘rational’ decision-making by sex offenders).  
 
 
Discussion 
 
Expressive crime sits readily within a rational choice framework and there are too 
many relevant SCP measures to trawl through them here for each of Hayward’s 
expressive crimes. There is clearly much work to be done in the development of 
situational responses to these and many other crimes, but it does not follow that the 
approach and theory are not applicable.   
 
 
Rational Choice 
 
This section has three parts. It looks more closely at Hayward’s critique of the rational 
choice perspective.  
 
 
How to build a robust theory 
 
Hayward expresses concern that the SCP and rational choice perspective ‘lacks 
reflexivity’ (p. 233). By this, he appears to suggest there is a failure to adapt to 
changing knowledge, circumstances and criticism. Some light might be shed upon the 
issue by reference to the useful list of key developments in choice theory provided by 
McFadden (2000), shown as table 3. 
Rather than ‘lacking reflexivity’, McFadden’s summary shows how the field is 
characterized by debate, adaptation and progress, as the theory grows and adapts to 
incorporate new knowledge. Along similar lines, Kahneman (an author whom 
Hayward refers to in passing on p. 234) observed in relation to bounded rationality:  
 
It is encouraging to note, however, that the challenge of incorporating the first 
wave of psychological findings into economics appeared even more daunting 
20 years ago, and that challenge has been met with considerable success 
(Kahneman [2003]: 1470) 
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Table 3: Summary of cognitive effects in decision-making 
Effect Description 
Anchoring Responses are influenced by cues contained in the question 
Availability Responses rely too heavily on readily retrieved information, and 
too little on background information 
Context Previous questions and interviewer interaction colour perception 
Framing/reference    
point 
Question format changes saliency of different aspects of the 
cognitive task 
Focal Quantitative information is stored and/or reported categorically 
Primary/recency Initial and recently experienced events are the most salient 
Projection Responses are consonant with the self-image the subject wishes 
to project 
Prospect The likelihoods of low-probability events are misjudged, and 
treated either as too likely or as zero 
Regression Causality or permanence are attached to past fluctuations, and 
regression to the mean is underestimated 
Representativeness High conditional probabilities induce overestimates of 
unconditional probabilities 
Rule-driven Motivation and self-control induce strategic responses 
Saliency The most salient aspects of the question are overemphasized 
Status quo Current status and history are privileged 
Superstition Elaborate causal structures are attached to coincidences 
Temporal  Temporally inconsistent time discounting 
Source: From McFadden (2000: 347). 
 
 
The dialectical process of criticism and revision that is noted by McFadden and 
Kahneman is the signature of a robust and reflexive (in Hayward’s terms) theory. 
Consider Darwin’s theory of evolution (1859). It has been refined over time, and 
proponents debate among themselves; the debate between Stephen Jay Gould and 
Richard Dawkins over the specifics of evolutionary progress was perhaps the best 
known (see e.g. Dawkins 2003). Nevertheless, evolution remains the most convincing 
explanation of life on earth. In relation to choice theory, McFadden concluded that 
much empirical work remains to be done to keep up with theory and continue the 
iterations of development and improvement:  
 
The potentially important role of perceptions, ranging from classical 
psychophysical perception of attributes, through psychological shaping of 
perceptions to reduce dissonance, to mental accounting for times and costs, 
remains largely unexplored in empirical research. (McFadden 2001: 373–4) 
 
The work of McFadden and Kahneman is not criminology, but is about human 
choices, heuristics and departures from strict rationality. Such thinking influenced 
criminological choice theory from the outset: Cornish (1978), for example, discusses 
Tversky (1967) and Tversky and Kahneman (1974) at length. There is certainly 
tremendous scope to progress the rational choice approach to offending, not least 
because it is a metatheory (Cornish 1993) that dovetails well with dispositional 
theories of offending via the concepts of preferences and constraints (see also Cornish 
and Clarke 1986; Felson 1986; Tibbetts and Gibson 2001). But the reasoning criminal 
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and the intuitive and irrational criminal are compatible theoretical concepts. When 
writers such as Ronald Clarke, Derek Cornish and Ken Pease (key subjects of 
Hayward’s article) use choice theory, it is as a frame for informing the development 
of crime prevention, and they use the theory in a rather modest, understated fashion. 
This is because they know rational choice is a powerful vehicle and that criminology 
still drives it in second gear or, in the case of many criminologists, into the nearest 
tree.  
 
 
Intangible costs 
 
An assertion that Hayward offers as a criticism of the rational choice perspective is 
that ‘not all actors are economically self-interested’ (p. 233). The crux of the issue 
here is the definition of the term ‘economically self-interested’. Hayward seems to 
suggest that some decisions involve more than money but that choice theory only 
includes decisions relating to money. Yet the term ‘economic’ incorporates all 
elements of a decision, whatever they are, including all aspects of non-monetary 
costs. That is why the textbook model of economic decision-making is one of utility 
maximization, not income or money maximization. Hence psychological costs, 
including expressive emotional elements and sensations, are a critical component in 
determining whether something is economic.  
Monetary gain is a goal of acquisitive crime. However, benefits from crime 
are often psychological or non-monetary and are known as intangible costs. Burglars 
and robbers report experiencing a rush (Feeney 1986; J. Smith 2003; Nee and 
Meenaghan 2006). The non-monetary benefits of crime can include the perceived 
reward of being able to control another individual through violence or threats or 
graffiti, the thrill of committing a crime or impressing potential sexual partners or 
onlooking peers. Many such elements were touched on in the review of examples of 
‘expressive’ crimes above, and are summarized in table 4. Perceived benefits from 
committing a crime can be subjective, reflecting personal preferences. However, it is 
clear that choice theory, via this cost–benefit calculation, applies across crime types. 
In the broader field of cost–benefit analysis, there have been advances in the 
estimation of the intangible costs of crime and fear. The focus to date has been on 
these costs as experienced by victims (Miller et al. 1996; Cohen 2000; Cohen et al. 
2004; Dolan et al. 2005; Atkinson et al. 2005; Dubourg et al. 2005). There is certainly 
scope for improvement and for developing estimates of intangible costs involved in 
offending decisions. However, this does not mean the theoretical framework does not 
allow for their inclusion or that it cannot be used to inform situational responses.  
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Table 4: Types of perceived cost and benefit of committing crime 
 Costs Benefits 
Monetary • Expenditure on tools 
• Cost of travel to 
offence site 
• Possible opportunity 
cost of time 
(including: learning 
skills, search time, 
committing the crime 
and escaping) 
• Cash 
• Goods that can be used, 
exchanged or sold 
Non-monetary  
(intangible) 
• Physical 
effort/energy 
• Psychological and 
emotional 
effort/energy  
• Shame, remorse, 
guilt 
• Negative aspects 
of being labelled – 
peer and other 
condemnation 
• Worry/concern 
about punishment 
(including concerns 
about significant 
others) 
• Other negative 
emotions, sensations 
or feelings 
• Time and energy saved (from 
cutting corners) 
• Excitement/thrill 
• Feelings of control and power 
over others 
• Feeling of freedom and control 
over one’s own acts 
• Potential boost to self-esteem 
• Perceived extra sexual 
opportunities 
• Positive aspects of being 
labelled (kudos, peer and other 
esteem) 
• Other positive emotions, 
sensations, or feelings 
 
 
 
Irrationality and the intuitive criminal 
 
People make choices between criminal and non-criminal alternatives. Sometimes 
these are quick or impulsive decisions. Sometimes the decisions are based on 
imperfect information or perception, or impaired by alcohol, drugs or emotion. 
However flawed, they are nevertheless the product of a decision-making process. This 
is generally termed bounded rationality or limited rationality, attributed to Herbert 
Simon (1957, 1978), and widely used in criminology (e.g. Walsh 1986; Opp 1997; 
Brezina 2001; Wilkinson 2001). Although such decisions, particularly those relating 
to offending, are not ‘rational’ in the everyday sense of that word, they are made upon 
the platform of weighing perceived costs and benefits, that is, within the choice theory 
framework. This means impaired, poor, emotionally driven, or satisficing decisions 
that are ‘irrational’ fit into the rational choice framework, and can be caricatured as 
follows: 
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o Intuitive and impulsive (including elements of emotional) decisions are not 
thought through: ‘It seemed like a good idea’; ‘I wasn’t thinking’; ‘I regret it 
now’; ‘I was hot-headed’; ‘It was spur-of-the-moment’. 
o Imperfect decisions based on a lack of information: ‘I didn’t know they had a 
dog/silent alarm/CCTV)’; ‘At the time, I didn’t think of the consequences’. 
o Impaired (including emotional) decisions: ‘I wasn’t thinking straight’; ‘It was 
the alcohol/drugs not me’; ‘It was my uncontrollable teenage angst/contempt 
for society’; ‘I was angry because he looked at my pint’. 
 
Crime-specific examples may further illustrate bounded rationality in relation 
to SCP. Even the wildest or most bizarre and irrational crimes involve some degree of 
‘rational’ decision-making. Gun-wielding mass murderers often make excellent 
choice of weaponry, vulnerable targets and suitable environments (think Dunblane, 
Columbine). Serial killers make remarkably sound choices of vulnerable victims and 
hide their tracks, sometimes for long periods (think Harold Shipman), sometimes 
forever (think Jack the Ripper). Arsonists, who are ‘fire-setting’ on Hayward’s list, 
choose flammable targets and purchase accelerants, and usually set fires in places 
which will maximize damage and/or minimize detection (burned-out stolen cars), or 
maximize insurance claims (fraud). Even the most disturbed, flailing drunk knows 
who ‘the enemy’ is – it may be anybody in the vicinity – and attacks people with 
whatever tools are available (a beer bottle, a pint glass). Suicidal persons make 
‘rational’, often ingenious, choices of a modus operandi, which is why shoelaces, 
belts and solid hanging points are removed from the cells of suicidal prisoners (see 
e.g. Hayes 1995). The heroin-dependent offender committing crime to fund a habit 
still ‘rationally’ tries to conceal their habit-feeding shoplifting, ‘rationally’ uses a 
weapon to increase success rates for street robbery, or ‘rationally’ robs the pharmacy 
not the shoe shop to find drugs. Trevor Bennett assessed heroin addiction from a 
rational choice perspective (Bennett 1986; see Becker and Murphy 1988 for a theory 
of rational addiction). From the perspective of SCP, then, which is the context for this 
discussion, even seemingly perverse and highly irrational behaviour still involves 
decisions with elements that mean the crimes are amenable to situational responses.  
A specific aspect of bounded rationality that Hayward addresses at length 
relates to the immediacy or impulsivity of expressive crime and the apparent lack of 
deferred gratification of some offender decision-making, characterized as a ‘culture of 
now’ (pp. 238–9). Passing reference was made to the issue of discounting, but it 
seemed to be too quickly dismissed. Discounting is a process used in cost–benefit 
analysis to account for the influence of time upon preferences and value. The fact that 
preferences are time-sensitive (we prefer some things now but will defer others) is 
referred to as the social rate of time preference (Gramlich 1990). Time preferences 
can be exponential, hyperbolic if extreme, and can change or be inconsistent 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Since different people have different preferences, 
they have different implicit discount rates in their decision-making. People with a 
preference for immediacy make different decisions from those made by people 
without such a preference. That is, discounting accounts for the ‘now’ preference in 
the decision-making of some individuals, and cannot be dismissed. Nor is it in choice 
theory. 
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Reflexions on Cultural Criminology 
 
There’s no pleasing some people.  
(Jesus, son of God, according to Monty Python’s Life of Brian11) 
 
At this stage it would be remiss not to offer reflexions on Hayward’s cultural 
criminology. What follows is based on Hayward (2007) plus an assessment of 
Hayward and Young’s (2007) review essay, which is partly a response to O’Brien 
(2005). This is not a comprehensive review, so the reader should not generalize from 
the findings.  
 
 
Shopping for a theory 
 
Martin O’Brien identifies at least four key weaknesses in cultural criminology: 
 
1. ‘[Cultural criminology] is characterized by important confusions over what is 
meant by “culture” in the analysis of deviant and criminal activity.’ 
2. ‘[T]he absence of detailed engagement with classic debates in social anthropology 
serves to undermine cultural criminology’s assertion that the lens of culture 
provides a critical tool for understanding criminal acts.’ 
3. ‘[Cultural criminology] is characterized by a contradiction between its 
ethnographic imagination and its anthropological imagination,’ 
 
leading him to suggest that 
 
4. ‘[T]he absence of a detailed theoretical account of culture renders cultural 
criminology vulnerable to Gouldner’s (1975) charge that its practitioners represent 
contemporary “zoo-keepers” of deviance.’ (O’Brien 2005: 599) 
 
Confusion over the meaning of culture is ‘found both in cultural criminology’s key 
empirical works and in the emerging theoretical frameworks that seek to interpret 
crime through the lens of culture’ (O’Brien 2005: 599). This lack of clarity and 
originality led O’Brien to conclude: 
 
Of course, whether cultural criminology really does represent a new 
intellectual endeavour rather than a logical elaboration of previous work on 
deviant subcultures is itself debatable. (2005: 600) 
 
In response to O’Brien, Hayward and Young state that cultural criminology has been 
around for fifteen years, but note that 
 
[d]espite many positive developments, the trajectories and methods of cultural 
criminology have yet to be firmly established. (2007: 103) 
 
This is not so much a refutation of O’Brien’s criticisms as an admission that cultural 
criminology is adrift. In relation to more specific aspects of method, Hayward and 
Young propose that:  
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A core methodological component of cultural criminology is therefore the 
scholarly reading of the numerous texts and images that circulate and 
promulgate the ‘story’ of crime and crime control within society. (2007: 108) 
 
Reading, of the scholarly variety no less, is offered as a ‘core methodological 
component’ of cultural criminology.  
 
 
Liquid definitions 
 
Expressive crime appears to be a central concern of Hayward’s (2007) cultural 
criminology. Yet it does not appear to be clearly defined, and implies a dichotomy of 
expressive and instrumental. As suggested already, this is clearly not the case – many, 
perhaps most, crimes labelled ‘expressive’ contain at least significant elements of 
instrumentality (Tedeschi and Felson 1994; Wilkinson 2001). Definitional and 
conceptual limitations may be inferred from the fact that Hayward’s set of 
‘expressive’ crimes (look back at table 1) appears to lack any obvious unifying 
concept. It also reads as oddly selective. Some of the set – skateboarding, street 
protesting and Parkour free running – are not even crimes. Their inclusion seems to 
mimic early deviancy studies that addressed issues such as the management of 
respectability in nudist camps and having breakfast with topless barmaids (Weinberg 
1966, 1970, and Ames, Brown and Weinberg 1970, cited in Sparks 1980: 201). Jock 
Young noted of such work that 
 
it is engaged in a remarkable accomplishment – the development of a 
criminology that does not deal with property crime, and a criminology whose 
subjects live not in a world of work but in a world of leisure. (Young 1975: 
68–9, cited in Sparks 1980: 201) 
 
Complementing this world of leisure, an overt celebration of offenders seems to 
appear in the representation of expressive offenders as ‘urban-adventurer criminals’ 
(p. 244). Is the physical injury and humiliation of a victim of happy slapping the work 
of modern-day Robin Hoods? This seems to ignore the harm experienced by victims. 
This is compounded by the term ‘shallow-end crime’ as Hayward uses it (pp. 236, 
237), which could be interpreted as downplaying the experiences of victims of street 
crime.  
In Hayward’s assessment, injuries to victims seem to come across, to this 
reader at least, as a form of collateral damage, with capitalism indirectly to blame for 
friendly fire from alienated individuals referred to using Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of 
‘sensation-gatherers’ (p. 239). Sensation-gatherers are offered as the conceptual 
development of Marxism’s traditional view of offenders as alienated ‘soldier-
producers’ (p. 239). However, it seems to come across as a new bandwagon for much 
the same message. Sensation-gathering seems as ambiguously defined as the 
expressive crimes being committed. The term would appear to suggest there are some 
crimes for which no sensations are gathered. Moreover, the suggestion that it is only 
new sensations that are gathered by the offender who ‘constantly craves new 
experience’ (p. 239, emphasis in original) would seem to imply that an offender 
moves on after experiencing the sensation once, it no longer being new. If that is the 
case, it would limit the possibility for either repeat offending by the same crime type 
or for repeat victimization by the same offenders, making it irrelevant to a broad 
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swath of crime and criminology. The term ‘sensation-gathering’ warrants 
examination. It could be said to sound as if offenders are strolling through a sweet 
summer meadow, and if so, that the term possibly results in a subtle romanticization 
of offending. When combined with urban-adventurer criminals in their world of 
leisure it is suggestive of some of the more inappropriate forms of cultural relativism. 
In the present context, however, and independent of the definition, sensations are 
benefits or costs that are incorporated in the decision-making process when 
committing crime, and hence in choice theory.  
 
 
Liquid criminology 
 
To this reader, cultural criminology’s goals seem rather unclear. However, there is a 
hint of a crime reduction aim in Hayward’s argument that crime problems can only be 
tackled by major structural social reform or ‘macro-level socio-political intervention’ 
(p. 235). ‘Expensive’ policies (p. 235) are alluded to that would reduce crime, but no 
further explanation is given. It is difficult to draw conclusions from such a brief 
allusion to a policy agenda. 
In the broader context of this discussion it seems reasonable to suggest it is 
unlikely that cultural criminology has much to offer crime reduction. Such a 
possibility would sit well with O’Brien’s (2005) suggestion that cultural criminology 
may be more of a style than a theory or approach. It would also seem to have parallels 
with the conclusion drawn nearly 30 years ago by Richard F. Sparks (1980), which 
was that Marxist criminology lacked a distinct criminological perspective (even 
though a distinction may be claimed between Marxist and post-Marxist perspectives). 
Nevertheless, the present writer would like to see Hayward’s assertions regarding 
‘expensive’ alternatives developed into a clear policy agenda with an explicit 
mechanism by which reductions in crime would be achieved.  
 
 
Liminal tendencies 
 
Rioting gives people a sense of community. And isn’t that what we’re all 
seeking in this age of computers and global warming?  
(Police Chief Wiggum12) 
 
An element of Hayward’s argument is the repeated assertion that expressive crimes 
are rapidly growing in number: 
 
• ‘a growing number of so-called “expressive crimes”’ (p. 233);  
• ‘the growing number of crimes containing a high emotional or “expressive” 
element’ (p. 237);  
• ‘the type of expressive (‘affective’) crimes that are on the increase within 
contemporary consumer societies’ (p. 242);  
• ‘the growing number of so-called expressive crimes’ (p. 244). 
 
It is unclear whether Hayward means the prevalence of expressive crime types or the 
incidence of all expressive crime, but it seems that little or no supporting evidence is 
presented for either. By 2007, most types of crime in England and Wales had been 
declining for the best part of a decade according to the most reliable indicators 
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(Walker et al. 2006). The steep and prolonged decline in crime in the United States, 
the country most notably manifesting the consumerism that is cultural criminology’s 
target, was perhaps most well known (see e.g. Blumstein and Wallman 2000). These 
trends may not suit Hayward’s argument, but that does not mean they can be ignored.  
Hayward refers to (but does not source) empirical evidence that binge drinking 
has increased (p. 238). Binge drinking may lead to crime although, as noted, many 
crime types decreased in the decade before Hayward’s work. Hayward finds an 
increase in binge drinking odd and says we need to look ‘at what has happened from a 
cultural perspective’ (p. 238), but offers no further explanation. The explanation for 
an increase in binge drinking would most likely be found primarily in the laws of 
supply and demand: How could it not increase in the face of huge falls in the price of 
alcohol plus huge increases in availability from supermarkets and new bars?13 But 
more importantly, Hayward’s use of empirical evidence to support an argument 
appears rather selective.  
If cultural criminology may have a tendency to disregard empirical evidence, 
it would perhaps be complemented by the dismissal of the use of statistics and 
formulae. Along those lines, Hayward’s assessment of Exum’s use of a formula 
concludes:  
 
Thus is the intractable question of criminality reduced to a two-inch formula – 
at least for the purposes of statistical policy analysis. (Hayward 2007: 234) 
 
The formula referred to is straightforward and represents offender decision-making as 
involving the weighing of perceived costs and benefits, or that ‘all crime is a function 
of perceived pain and pleasures’ (Exum 2002: 957). Perhaps surprisingly, however, 
Hayward offers no substantive criticism of any component of the formula or any item 
of substance in Exum’s article, just a dismissal.14 Such a view of ‘statistical policy 
analysis’ does not seem to be justified. It is, for the present writer, somewhat 
reminiscent of Irigaray’s criticism of Einstein’s E = Mc2 formula for ‘privileging 
what goes the fastest’ (see Sokal and Bricmont 1998: xix, 100; Dawkins 1998). In this 
reader’s view, the wholesale dismissal of statistical method, when combined with 
further dismissive reference to an ‘all-too-typical empirical study’ (p. 237), falls some 
way short of constituting an informed critique. It would be a particularly narrow 
perspective that perceives no role for formulae or statistical policy analysis.  
Following the wholesale dismissal of Exum’s work, just three pages later, 
Hayward offers Exum’s criticism of rational choice theory as support for his own 
argument, noting: ‘One recent test of the RC perspective by Exum is particularly 
illuminating . . . he states that “the [RC] perspective may not be the general 
explanation for crime it is proclaimed to be”’ (p. 237). Having derided it, to then 
present the same work as ‘for’ the argument represents remarkable tolerance of 
cognitive dissonance.15  
 
 
Liminal tendencies II 
 
The first reference in the first paragraph of Hayward’s article offers Farrell and Pease 
(2001) as containing a summary of Ken Pease’s work on preventing repeat burglaries. 
It does not.16 However, this could be debated and a referencing error is arguably 
minor, but it was introduced here only as a prelude. Insight into Hayward’s cultural 
criminology might be gleaned from the fact that Ronald Clarke is found to be the 
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leading proponent of SCP and rational choice (p. 235) but there is no reference to any 
of Clarke’s studies published in the previous decade, of which there are dozens, all 
relevant. However, the book by Clarke and Felson (1993: 6) is referred to. They argue 
that crime is 
 
purposive behaviour designed to meet the offender’s commonplace needs for 
such things as money, status, sex and excitement, and that meeting those needs 
involves the making of (sometimes quite rudimentary) decisions and choices, 
constrained as these are by limits of time and ability and the availability of 
relevant information. 
 
This is fairly unambiguous and is representative of Clarke’s work. It is unclear how it 
could be concluded from this that status, excitement and other intangible costs are not 
part of offender decision-making. The landmark book The Reasoning Criminal is also 
cited by Hayward. Its Introduction notes 
 
the individual's recognition of his or her ‘readiness’ to commit the specific 
offense in order to satisfy certain needs for money, goods, or excitement. 
(Cornish and Clarke 1986: 4) 
 
Several other chapters of that book are explicit on these issues, as are many 
criminological works, some referenced previously herein. More broadly speaking, an 
inspection of Hayward’s reference list would lead an uninformed reader to suspect 
there was little or no work relating to SCP in the preceding decade, when this is not 
the case. This does not mean earlier works are properly addressed. For example, the 
possibility that SCP does not address expressive crime was raised by Trasler (1986) in 
a paper cunningly disguised as ‘Situational crime control and rational choice: a 
critique’ in Heal and Laycock’s classic collection that appears on Hayward’s list of 
references. It is difficult not to conclude that there are some significant omissions 
from the 2007 study, and that the resultant under-representation of the relevant 
literature may be partly responsible for some of the conclusions.  
 
 
Shopping for a theory II 
 
There does not appear to be a cohesive theory of the relationship between crime and 
culture that can be identified in Hayward’s (2007) presentation of cultural 
criminology. References to a focus on ‘complex existential motivations’ of offenders 
(p. 236), ‘the complex socio-cultural dynamics and existential dilemmas that are at the 
root of all crimes’ (p. 246), and the ‘subjective experiences and highly textured socio-
cultural situations behind all crimes’ (p. 238) go largely unexplained. There is little 
revelation in observing that some crime may be partly due to teenage angst. In 
addition, most criminology that seeks to explain or understand criminality usually 
does so as a stepping stone to developing crime reduction policy and practice, but that 
does not seem to be the case here. More generally, cultural criminology appears to 
this reader to be a combination of existing elements of the sociology of deviance and 
some post-Marxist ‘postmodernism’, with rather confused consequences. It seems to 
play on the ambiguity of the term ‘cultural’, which could cover things including 
popular culture and the media, high culture and aesthetics, the Cultural Revolution in 
China, and cultural variations in habit and custom. However, making the simplifying 
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assumption that culture refers to habits, customs and behavioural norms, let us ask 
two simple questions: What causes cultural change? How would cultural change 
cause crime? Put this way, it becomes apparent there is a powerful theory of crime 
and cultural change staring us in the face. It is termed routine activity theory.  
Routine activity theory was originally published as a critical account of how 
socio-economic progress and the forces of capitalism caused crime, in Cohen and 
Felson’s ‘Social change and crime rate trends: a routine activity approach’ (1979). It 
is pessimistic and prescient of the types of anti-globalization, anti-consumerist 
argument inherent in cultural criminology. It theorizes (see Felson 2002, for a more 
optimistic recent statement) crime as the product of social change, with the key 
driving forces being technological, socio-economic, environmental and political. The 
mechanism of change is the nature and frequency of interactions between suitable 
targets and potential offenders in the absence of capable guardians.  
Routine activity theory helps understand how cultural change and variation 
drives crime. In this context, cultural changes tend to be changes in behaviour that 
are, when offending is the behaviour, induced by changes in criminal opportunities 
and provocations. So, progress brought more and better cars in the twentieth century, 
which changed our lives but also provided vast opportunities for car crime. And as 
society’s mobility and movement patterns changed, so did its crime patterns. 
Television, iPods and mobile phones change our habits, behaviour and lifestyles 
(cultural change) and drive up theft rates. Happy slapping was facilitated by 
technological change – digital cameras, mobile phones and the Internet. The Internet 
facilitates cultural change and e-crimes (see Newman and Clarke 2003, on 
prevention), while globalization is suggested to have facilitated some forms of 
terrorism (see Clarke and Newman 2006, on prevention). Significant progress in 
transportation and telecommunications technologies in the twentieth century brought 
exponential growth in international exchanges, including trade and travel. The process 
brought national cultures closer together in the global village, while assisting and 
shaping crimes such as international drug trafficking (Keh and Farrell 1997; Farrell 
1998). This is brief coverage but the key is that globalization and ‘consumerist 
society’ can drive up crime via criminal opportunities and provocations. So the 
present writer would propose that the best and most reflexive (in Hayward’s terms) 
theory is routine activity theory, at least for those parts of cultural criminology that 
examine the relationship between cultural variation and crime.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The reader should not be fooled into thinking that the present author believes 
situational crime prevention has been universally successful or unproblematic. It is 
still very much in its infancy. Some crimes appear difficult to prevent by situational 
means, including some forms of violence where there has been little research to date. 
SCP must be ethical and have due regard for civil liberties, and where it does not it is 
bad practice – hence Clarke (2000) clearly distinguishes ‘narrow’ from ‘broad’ 
situational measures (see also Clarke 2006). Where behaviours are incorrectly 
prohibited, then it is the law that should change. There are clear instances where that 
has occurred, such as homosexuality, which was substantially decriminalized in 
England and Wales under the 1967 Sexual Offences Act. There is a major need for 
further work to stimulate corporate social responsibility in designing out crime. And 
SCP must, of course, be highly adaptive, to account for changing crime in a changing 
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world. Alongside situational measures, other cost-effective approaches that reduce 
crime should prosper as complements, not substitutes. However, there is compelling 
evidence that Hayward’s first thesis has been disproved: SCP has been applied to 
expressive crimes in many ways, and has the potential to be more widely applied in 
the future. There is also compelling evidence that Hayward’s secondary thesis has 
been disproved and that in the context of informing SCP, rational choice theory 
applies to expressive and seemingly irrational criminal acts. The main conclusions of 
the present work can be summarized as five points:  
 
1. Situational crime prevention is applicable to all crime types.  
2. The rational choice perspective can be used to inform SCP in relation to all crime 
types including criminal acts labelled as expressive or irrational.  
3. Harm-reducing situational measures are widely utilized in most areas of social 
policy and everyday life.  
4. Cultural criminology seems to offer little, if anything, useful to inform crime 
reduction efforts. 
5. Routine activity theory could prove useful to cultural criminology, as it is a 
powerful theory of the relationship between cultural variation and crime. 
 
Cultural criminology was shown, using Hayward and Young’s own words, to lack 
clear aims. It also seems to have no transparent definition of culture, no clear 
understanding of the concepts of expressive crime or sensation-gathering that it 
claims as key subject matter, and to offer no original theory of crime prevention. Its 
proponents seem to claim this mix as an advantage. Onlookers may suspect the 
emperor has no clothes.  
Overall, the Hayward (2007) article seems to be characterized by a series of 
assertions that lack supporting argument or evidence. It appears to eschew empirical 
work at some times but to use it at others. While purporting to criticize situational 
crime prevention and rational choice, it seems that Hayward may have inadvertently 
exposed flaws in cultural criminology.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. The Simpsons, season 7, episode 11: ‘Marge Be Not Proud’. 
2. References using page numbers only will be to Hayward’s article. 
3. Felson’s theory can benefit from the simplifying assumption that criminal 
motivation is a given, but such assumptions are an important part of much 
theorizing. Elsewhere, rational choice is represented as claiming ‘motivational 
comprehensiveness’ (p. 235) when that is not even an aim in the context of SCP, 
where it is used to inform the development of crime prevention interventions. 
Other perspectives linked to SCP are implicitly targeted by association, including 
environmental criminology (pp. 235–6), work on resource allocation to crime hot 
spots (p. 236) and crime pattern analysis (p. 236). A series of seemingly minor 
asides can influence the overall tone and content of a study.  
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4. A Google search finds various gurus claiming or attributing the quote, but it is 
secular and mainly referenced as anonymous. 
5. Many tactics in table 2 are accepted and everyday measures that are situational in 
a broad sense rather than in the narrower sense of being developed as a result of 
action research with problem identification and evaluation (see Clarke 2006). 
6. Available at: www.popcenter.org/25techniques. 
7. On YouTube at: www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6OaRcsfnY4 (accessed 16 June 
2007). 
8. See: www.securedcarparks.com.  
9. Publications on tackling vandalism, with details on additional research, via 
www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk/vandalism01.htm  
10. My apologies if such an account already exists: As with most of the crime types 
here, the intention is not a comprehensive review but only one sufficient to 
demonstrate the invalidity of Hayward’s assertions.  
11. Brian (Graham Chapman) said it, to which the ex-leper (Michael Palin) 
exclaimed, ‘That’s just what Jesus said, sir!’ 
12. Chief Wiggum, The Simpsons Movie (Twentieth Century Fox, 2007). 
13. There are other factors, including new alcopops that attract young drinkers, 
‘happy hours’ and other promotions and incentives, and increased disposable 
income among young people. Note Hayward’s focus on change over time, not 
variation across places, where the explanation would be different (and where, say, 
cultural variation reflects legal and historical differences such as the British 
tradition of 11 p.m. closing time). Hayward also asserts binge drinking must be 
irrational ‘[u]nless, of course, one actually believes that people systematically and 
rationally set themselves the task of projectile vomiting in the street, falling asleep 
in doorways, or verbally abusing complete strangers’ (p. 238), which falls under a 
lack of understanding of the non-monetary rewards of drinking and intoxicated 
behaviour (peer pressure, kudos, war stories, etc. – see also Assaad and Exum 
2002). 
14. Hayward states: ‘Under the rubric of RC, the human purposes and existential 
meanings of crime are thus literally banned from the equation’ (p. 234). In my 
view this mainly aspires to be facetious but, if not, it is factually incorrect. This is 
because, to the extent that meaning and purpose are not already included in the 
variables of Exum’s table 4 (2002: 957), and could be further measured (perhaps 
as stated preferences, presuming Hayward could clarify what he means), they 
would be incorporated as components of Xb or Xc in the equation, that is, as 
elements of benefit or cost respectively.  
15. Moreover, Exum’s (2002) embryonic criticism of rational choice theory was 
unambiguously modified elsewhere in his work such that ‘physical aggression can 
in fact be seen as a “rational” and opportune choice to the intoxicated offender’ 
(Assaad and Exum 2002: 77). 
16. Farrell and Pease (2001) is not a summary of anything – it is an edited book. 
There are two chapters on repeat burglary, by Edward Kleemans (2001) and Frank 
Morgan (2001), neither of which is or can be characterized as a summary of 
Pease’s work on preventing repeat burglaries. 
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